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Abstract: This paper looks at the creation of the Czech Republic and Slovakia and its 
transitionary monetary union to illustrate the challenges - and opportunities - that a newly 
independent Scotland might face. The paper provides a background to the economic 
consequences of the dissolution on both the Czech Republic and Slovakia, their divergent paths 
in terms of economic policy and growth and the reasons why their monetary union was short-
lived. The lessons from this experience are then drawn with regard to the issues that might face 
a newly independent Scotland, were policy to follow the recommendations of the recent 
Sustainable Growth Commission report. Though not strict parallels, the economic experience of 
the dissolution of Czechoslovakia does have some lessons for a newly independent Scotland to 
consider.  
    
I Introduction 
The recent Sustainable Growth Commission report sets out the vision that Scotland could retain 
the pound sterling for an extended transition period after Scotland gains political independence 
from the UK.  Clearly, retaining the pound post-independence would reduce transaction costs 
such as the costs of currency conversion or the need for businesses to revalue their assets and 
liabilities. Furthermore, it could help reduce exchange rate uncertainty and help ensure that 
business and consumer confidence remains in place immediately after independence. However, 
the question of whether there would be fiscal and macroeconomic tensions between Scotland 
and rUK post-independence would be crucial for the sustainability of any transitionary monetary 
union. There are few international case studies that can be used to judge the success or 
otherwise of monetary union between two countries. An interesting example is the dissolution 
of Czechoslovakia in 1993 and the monetary arrangements that followed. The creation of the 
&]HFK5HSXEOLFDQG6ORYDNLDLVVRPHWLPHVUHIHUUHGWRDVWKHøWZR-VWHSEUHDNXSùDVLWLQYROYHG
first the political creation of the Czech Republic and Slovakia on 1st January 1993 and a 
subsequent creation of an independent monetary position 38 days later on 8th February 1993. 
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This paper discusses the background of how the Czechoslovak transitory monetary union was 
formed, its fiscal implications, how the monetary union ended, and how the two countries fared 
in the years afterwards.  This paper will also discuss the main lessons for a newly independent 
Scotland, such as the importance of expectations of financial markets and the need for 
symmetric macroeconomic developments with the rest of the UK for the sustainability of a 
transitory monetary union.  
 
II The Czechoslovak transitionary monetary union 
The federal state of Czechoslovakia was a twentieth century construct and dates back to 1918 
when it was created in the aftermath of the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. During 
the Second World War, the state split with the First Slovak Republic created as a satellite state 
of Germany, with limited sovereignty. Subsequent seizure of power by the Communist Party of 
Czechoslovakia after WWII led to the reunification of Czechoslovakia as a unitary socialist state 
under Soviet influence. During the Prague Spring in 1968 however, the Constitutional Law of 
)HGHUDWLRQ UHLQVWDWHG &]HFKRVORYDNLDöV RIILFLDO IHGHUDO VWUXFWXUH ZKLFK SURPLVHG D FRPPRQ
state consisting of two equal nations. However, despite its federal structure, the communist 
government concentrated its centralised power and policy-making powers in Prague, which led 
to the build-up of discontent amongst many Slovaks.  
The modern day dissolution of Czechoslovakia was a result of the 1992 parliamentary elections. 
The decision to dissolve Czechoslovakia was taken by then Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus 
and Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar, as a political decision without the constitutional 
backdrop of a referendum. At the time, the main points of disagreement between the Czech and 
Slovak governments were the redistribution of power between the federation and constituent 
republics and the design of future reforms. In order to mitigate the immediate negative economic 
effects of the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, such as an abrupt decline in bilateral trade or cross-
border investment, the decision was taken to retain a common currency, a customs union, and 
a common labour market. The monetary union would see both countries retain the Czechoslovak 
crown for a period of six months with further extensions to be considered after this period.  
The monetary union agreement stipulated that each side had the option to withdraw from the 
union if: (1) the fiscal deficit of either country exceeded 10%; (2) foreign exchange reserves in 
either country fell below one monWKöVZRUWK RI LWV LPSRUWV  LQWHU-country capital transfers 
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exceeded 5% of total bank deposits; (4) the Monetary Policy Committee was unable to reach 
agreement on fundamental monetary policy issues (Fidrmuc, Horvath, and Fidrmuc, 1999). The 
former monetary policy authority, the State Bank of Czechoslovakia (SBCS), was replaced by an 
independent central bank for each country and a joint monetary board was established with a 
50:50 representation from each central bank to take decisions on joint monetary policy.  
 
III Fiscal implications of the monetary union and independence 
,W LV KDUG WR MXGJH WKH LPPHGLDWH ILVFDO LPSDFW RI WKH PRQHWDU\ XQLRQ RQ ERWK FRXQWULHVö
economies due to its (very) short-lived existence. However, post the ending of the monetary 
union in February 1993, both the Czech Republic and Slovakia experienced a recession with 
Czech GDP falling by 1% and Slovak GDP falling by 4% (Fidrmuc, Horvath, and Fidrmuc, 1999). 
To a large degree, this was a reform-induced recession associated with the transition from 
centrally planned economies to free-market economies. The contraction in GDP could have also 
been partly induced by the after-effects of the 1991 global recession. Nevertheless, the costs 
associated with building new institutions, the decrease in mutual trade, and the cessation of 
any fiscal transfers between the two countries also contributed to the deepening of the 
recession. According to Sujan and Sujanova (1994), the overall costs associated with the 
dissolution were 2.1% of Czech and 5.7% of Slovak GDP.  
The liabilities of the federal state, such as banknotes, commercial bank reserves held by the 
federal central bank, and debt obligations towards the IMF, were divided 2:1 according to the 
population ratio between the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Immovable assets were taken over 
by the country where they were located with all other assets being divided by their population 
ratio. Throughout the post-war history of Czechoslovakia, Slovakia had consistently been a net 
recipient of fiscal transfers from the Czech Republic. The estimates of the size of the net fiscal 
transfer in 1992 vary in size from 13.5 billion Czechoslovak crowns (CSK) (Hajek et al., 1993) to 
CSK 25 billion (OECD, 1994), equivalent to between 4.4% and 8% of Slovak GDP. Given the non-
zero sum nature of the fiscal transfers, with the dissolution of Czechoslovakia the Czech 
Republic gained and Slovakia lost the value of the implicit liability to continue these fiscal 
transfers into the future. 
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IV The ending of the Czech / Slovak monetary union 
The abrupt ending of the Czech / Slovak monetary union was associated with underlying and 
long-WHUPVWUXFWXUDOWHQVLRQVEHWZHHQWKHFRXQWULHVöHFRQRPLHVDQGLPPHGLDWHGHYHORSPHQWV
around the dissolution of Czechoslovakia. Firstly, the monetary union and the Czechoslovak 
crown failed to achieve credibility in the financial markets.  The newly-established joint 
monetary committee was comprised of the governors and two senior officials from each central 
bank. However, as tKH PDUNHWV FRUUHFWO\ DQWLFLSDWHG WKH FRXQWULHVö GLYHUJHQFH LQ
macroeconomic variables such as unemployment and GDP growth before and after the 
dissolution of Czechoslovakia made decisions in pursuit of the common interests of the single 
currency impossible. Higher unemployment and weaker growth meant that Slovak authorities 
were in favour of lower interest rates and competitive devaluation of the Czechoslovak crown, 
whereas this was clearly not in the best interest of their Czech counterparts. Although the 
decisions on monetary policy were made by the joint monetary committee, the implementation 
of policy decisions was left to the national central banks. This contributed to a dysfunctional 
institutional design for conducting monetary policy and led to an undermining of the 
&]HFKRVORYDNFURZQöVFUHGLELOLW\RQILQDQFLDOPDUNHWV 
This lack of credibility was expressed in a parallel exchange rate of the Czechoslovak crown 
relative to the US dollar (i.e. the exchange rate quoted by commercial banks) which climbed to 
be 78% higher than the official exchange rate (Firdmuc, Horvath, and Fidrmuc, 1999). 
Furthermore, due to the poor competitiveness of the Slovak economy relative to its neighbours, 
a devaluation of the new Slovak crown was expected at the end of the 6-month transition period. 
In anticipation of this, large capital outflows from Slovak to Czech banks occurred in late 1992 
and at the beginning of 1993. Furthermore, Slovak importers sought to repay their debts as soon 
as possible, while Czech importers wanted the exact opposite. The gradual outflow of currency 
from Slovakia to the Czech Republic further worsened the tensions associated with the single 
currency, as Slovak banks were prone to significant reductions in their liquidity1 which 
threatened to force them into insolvency, were no government action taken.  
                                                                
1 The impact of severe decline in back liquidity, such as in the 2008 banking crisis, demonstrate the severely destabilising effects 
for the real economy. 
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$VLQJOHFXUUHQF\PD[LPLVHVHFRQRPLFHIILFLHQF\LIWKHUHJLRQZKHUHLWLVXVHGLVDQõRSWLPXP
FXUUHQF\ DUHDö2. The Czechoslovak experience suggests that the two countries were not an 
optimum currency area and that there were several asymmetric developments in the two 
economies. Optimum currency area literature argues that labour mobility is a key adjustment 
mechanism in the event of asymmetric shocks (Mundell, 1961). In the event of an asymmetric 
shock, such as a decrease in demand for goods in a country, high labour mobility can bring the 
goods market back into equilibrium by workers migrating to another country and reducing the 
natural rate of unemployment in the domestic country. However, if labour mobility is low, the 
adjustment must come through higher prices and lower wages.  The data from Czech Republic 
and Slovakia suggests that there was a low degree of inter-regional / inter-country labour 
mobility. This magnified the pre-existing, pre-dissolution macroeconomic impacts of the 
differences in unemployment rates between the two countries. In December 1992, the 
unemployment rate was 2.6% in the Czech Republic and 10.4% in Slovakia. Close to a year after 
the dissolution, in December 1993, the difference had increased even further; Czech 
unemployment increased to 3.5% and the Slovak rate increased to 14.4% (Fidrmuc, Horvath, 
and Fidrmuc, 1999).  
Industry specialisation and the synchronisation of business cycles are also important factors for 
a successful optimum currency area. The incidence of asymmetric shocks is much smaller in a 
diversified economy than in a specialised one. In the case of Slovakia, most of its industry was 
built in the period after the 1948 communist takeover with a focus on heavy engineering, 
metallurgy, and the chemical industry (Pavlinek, 1995). The communist political objectives were 
also mirrored in the reliance on the military equipment industry where a substantial amount of 
exports was directed to the former Soviet bloc. On the other hand, Czech industry was more 
diversified and focused on high value-added sectors. The reliance of Slovakia on heavy and 
military industries may have amplified the asymmetric shocks which in turn contributed to the 
collapse of the monetary union. 
                                                                
2 7KHWKHRU\RIõRSWLPXPFXUUHQF\DUHDö was first introduced by Mundell (1961) and shows that countries should join a monetary 
union if the costs of doing so are lower than the benefits. The four main criteria for a region to form an optimum currency area are: 
(1) an integrated labour market where labour can move freely, (2) flexibility of pricing and wages, along with mobility of capital, (3) 
A redistribution mechanism to redistribute capital to parts of the area that have suffered because of labour and capital mobility, 
(4) a synchronisation of business cycles between the participating regions or countries. 
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A lower correlation of permanent output shocks (i.e. long-term trends in GDP growth between 
the two countries) can be a destabilising factor for a currency union. If countries in a currency 
union do not have synchronised business cycles the central bank will struggle to offset 
economic recessions and contain inflation for the whole area. Data suggests that the correlation 
of permanent output shocks between the Czech Republic and Slovakia ranged from 0.34 and 
0.53 for different time periods between 1948 to 1990 (Fidrmuc, Horvath, Fidrmuc, 1999). This 
was much lower than other monetary unions such as the US, where the correlation of permanent 
output shocks ranged from 0.69 to 0.86 (Fidrmuc, Horvath, Fidrmuc, 1999). These developments 
suggest that the monetary union was experiencing structural tensions throughout its history that 
were further amplified after the dissolution of Czechoslovakia. These factors created 
macroeconomic imbalances which it is argued contributed to the collapse of the post-
dissolution transitionary monetary union.  
 
V The path from monetary union to the Eurozone 
The fortunes of Slovakia and the Czech Republic after dissolution were very different in the 
1990s. The Czech Republic pursued a path of reform and market liberalisation that led it to 
achieve economic success in the late 1990s, while Slovakia remained stuck in a period of 
secular stagnation with a government led by Prime Minister Meciar which had no enthusiasm for 
reforms. Despite averaging economic growth of 6% between 1994 and 1996 and over 4% until 
WKH6ORYDNHFRQRP\UHPDLQHGIUDJLOHDQGRQDQXQVXVWDLQDEOHSDWKÉXVWHU7KH
output gap created by the 1991 recession was finally overhauled by 1996, but growth was 
IXHOOHG PDLQO\ E\ H[SDQVLRQDU\ ILVFDO SROLF\ ÉXVWHU  $V H[SHFWHG WKLV H[SDQVLRQDU\
fiscal policy was associated with a high government deficit (4.7% in 1998) and a build-up in 
government debt (28.9% of GDP in 1998, up from 11.5% in 1996). Long-term unemployment 
FRQWLQXHGWRJURZZLWKWKHXQHPSOR\PHQWUDWHUHDFKLQJDKLJKRILQÉXVWHU
After the 1998 election a reformist government took power and started to modernise the Slovak 
economy. Bold free market reforms and fiscal policies aimed at stabilising government debt to 
IXOILOWKH0DDVWULFKWFULWHULDHQDEOHGWKHVWDUWRI6ORYDNLDöVHQWU\WR(XURSHDQ8QLRQ(8LQ
Subsequently, tax breaks and tariff breaks, subsidies for new employment and government 
commitments to build infrastructure were made. This helped draw in foreign direct investment 
(FDI), particularly into the car industry.  This significant increase in FDI contributed to Slovakia 
posting the fastest economic growth in Central Europe ZLWKLWEHLQJQLFNQDPHGWKHø7DWUD7LJHUù 
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During its entry into the EU, Slovakia committed to adopt the Euro once it had fulfilled the 
conditions set out in the Maastricht Treaty. Market-induced reforms of the early 2000s changed 
the structure of the Slovak economy and enabled convergence in macroeconomic variables 
towards the EU average. During the transition period, agriculture and industry, lost a great deal 
of their share of the economy, while services gained significantly (National Bank of Slovakia, 
2003). The reforms and transformation of the Slovak economy enabled the country to join the 
Eurozone in 2009. Zudel and Melioris (2016) estimated that by adopting the Euro, Slovakia 
gained a 10% boost in real GDP per capita by 2011. The benefits came mainly from the reduction 
in transaction and administrative costs and an increase in FDI and trade with key partners such 
as Germany.  
Figure 1 Real GDP growth rate in Czech Republic and Slovakia 
 
Source: Eurostat 
 
In 2004, both the Czech Republic and Slovakia joined the EU, but the Czech Republic decided 
not to adopt the Euro. The decision was a policy choice of Czech government and was based on 
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Euro area in areas such as price stability and industry specialisation had not been sufficient 
(MoF CZ and CNB, 2017). As shown in Figure 1, in the years immediately after the adoption of 
the Euro, Slovakia achieved higher GDP growth than the Czech Republic. Despite other factors 
(e.g. public spending providing a boost to aggregate demand) which could have contributed to 
this difference, it is clear that Slovakia benefited from adopting the Euro. 
 
VI The Sustainable Growth Commission and the Scottish context 
The Sustainable Growth Commission (2018) report suggests that a newly independent Scotland 
would need to achieve a substantial reduction in in its fiscal deficit to gain credibility in the 
markets and at that point it could make an orderly transition to a new currency.  
The report suggests that Scotland retains the pound sterling for an extended period after any 
vote for independence. During this period Scotland would face an interest rate regime set by the 
Bank of England. The SustDLQDEOH*URZWK&RPPLVVLRQVXJJHVWVWKDWDIWHUWKHõWUDQVLWLRQSHULRGö
6FRWODQGZRXOGHVWDEOLVKLWVRZQõQHZöFXUUHQF\7KHUHSRUWRIIHUVDURDGPDSDQGVHWVRXWSODQV
for financial regulation, banking, and the creation of a Scottish Central Bank (Sustainable 
Growth Commission. 2018). The Czechoslovak experience shows that if two newly independent 
countries face one interest rate, but their economies start diverging in terms of macroeconomic 
variables (e.g. GDP growth, inflation, unemployment, fiscal deficit) the central bank might find 
it difficult to set an interest rate which will be suitable for economic conditions in both countries.  
Scotland and the UK outside of London, share broadly similar characteristics. Key economic 
indices for Scotland tend to be similar to the UK average, albeit the London-effect does pull the 
UK number higher. The structure of the two economies are more similar than in the Czech and 
Slovak case, although the existence of oil in the Scottish economy is one key difference. 
However, whilst there may be economic similarities, the Czechoslovak case highlights how any 
meaningful differences, whether at the outset of independence or building up over time, have 
the potential to unsettle the underlying monetary union. Indeed, if the very purpose of 
independence is to build a different economy to the UK, then it necessarily follows that the 
system will become less stable.  
As highlighted earlier, Slovakia was a net recipient of fiscal transfers before 1993, with 
estimates of the size of the transfer varying from between 4.4% to 8% of GDP.  
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The Sustainable Growth Commission (2018) concedes that a newly independent Scotland would 
inherit a substantial fiscal deficit of circa 6% of GDP and it sets out a plan for reducing the deficit 
over a 10-\HDUSHULRG+RZHYHUDQ\õQHZö6FRWWLVKFXUUHQF\ZRXOGQHHGWRJDLQFUHGLELOLW\LQWKH
financial markets on the day after independence. Given an expected fiscal deficit of such a scale, 
WKHUH LVD ULVN WKDW ILQDQFLDOPDUNHWVFRXOGSXW WKH õQHZö6FRWWLVKFXUUHQF\XQGHUVXEVWDQWLDO
pressure.  
 
VII Conclusions 
The story of the dissolution of Czechoslovakia shows that transitionary monetary unions can be, 
depending on pre-existing circumstance, unstable. The main economic factors that led to the 
collapse of the Czechoslovak currency union were a low correlation of permanent output shocks, 
low labour mobility and a mismatched industrial composition (e.g. a higher concentration of 
heavy and military industries in Slovakia compared to the Czech Republic). A dysfunctional 
institutional design for monetary policy and pressure from the financial markets led to the rapid 
collapse of the Czechoslovak crown. Despite the fact that the Czechoslovak experience is an 
interesting case study of the feasibility of a monetary union after the split of two countries, it 
does need to be viewed within a wider economic, political and social context.  
It needs to be remembered that the Czech Republic and Slovakia were centrally planned 
economies for over 40 years prior to their attempt at sustaining a monetary union. Transition 
economies of such nature face many structural issues which the UK and Scotland simply would 
not, given over 300 years of political union and over 100 years of democracy and stable 
institutions. The path of market liberalisation and reforms after the monetary union collapsed 
led to faster growth in the Czech Republic relative to Slovakia. It was only with radical reforms in 
WKHHDUO\VWKDW OHG6ORYDNLDWREHFRPHWKHø7DWUD7LJHUù7KHVXVWDLQHGFRQYHUJHQFHLQ
macroeconomic variables towards the EU average allowed the country to complete its successful 
entry into the EU in 2004 and into the EurozRQHLQZKLFKKDYHXQGHUSLQQHG6ORYDNLDöV
success story to date. 
The Czechoslovak monetary union experiment shows that even small structural differences 
between two economies can make them more vulnerable to asymmetric shocks and will make 
the creation of a stable optimal currency area difficult.  If Scotland was to remain part of the 
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Common Travel Area, high labour mobility between Scotland and the rest of the UK could act as 
an adjustment mechanism to offset some of any macroeconomic imbalances.  
Whatever decision is taken however, perhaps the most significant lesson is that the 
expectations and behaviour of financial markets ó like it or not ó need to be borne in mind at all 
times. This will be true whether trying to maintain a monetary union or introducing a new Scottish 
currency.  
In summary, the Czechoslovak experience shows that the post-independence transitionary 
monetary union proposed by the Sustainable Growth Commission in Scotland could face 
challenges. At the same time however, the Slovak experience shows that with the right mix of 
institutional reforms accompanied with membership of the EU and Eurozone, there is a route to 
economic growth and increases in living standards. 
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